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Turbulent Times at Treasury: Applying the
Appointments Clause to IRS Appeals Officers
CHRISTOPHER DYKZEUL
I. INTRODUCTION
When a wealthy drug dealer claims you owe her $20,000 what do
you do? Maybe you say “no, there’s been a mistake, you have the wrong
person.” But what if the drug dealer remains adamant you owe her the full
$20,000? She tells you the only way to convince her to a lesser amount is
by taking your claim to her cousin, who is hired and employed by the drug
dealer to handle all her money disputes. The obvious problem here is in the
relationship between the cousin and the drug dealer. Even if the cousin is a
neutral arbitrator, his close relationship to the drug dealer reeks of
impropriety. After all, the cousin and the drug dealer are family relatives
and may even share financial rapport. Therefore, a person would have good
reason to doubt the impartiality of any decision made by the cousin to affirm
a debt owed to the drug dealer.
It may seem absurd to liken the IRS to a drug dealer, but the above
scenario is comparable to the IRS appeals process. A taxpayer who owes
money to the IRS may dispute their debt before an IRS Appeals Officer
(AO). However, much like the drug dealers’ cousin, the AO is both hired
and employed by the IRS. AOs not only share familial relations with the
IRS by being part of the same executive department, the two also share
financial and collegial rapport with each other. Thus, regardless if AOs are
truly neutral while arbitrating a taxpayer’s appeal, their close relationship to
the IRS reeks of impropriety; and even appearances of impropriety are
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enough to strip away public confidence1 in the independence of a decision
maker.2
This paper begins from a simple premise: requiring IRS AOs to be
appointed as inferior Officers under the Appointments Clause will
effectively mitigate existing appearances of impropriety currently borne by
such Officers.3 Specifically, subjecting AOs to the Appointments Clause
relieves notions of impropriety in two ways. First, because the authority to
appoint AOs will be given to an external entity, the IRS can no longer
“choose the judge in its own cause.”4 In other words, the IRS cannot be
accused of hiring AOs that are sympathetic to agency agendas if AOs are
appointed externally. Second, because the power to remove is incident to
the power to appoint,5 the IRS can no longer use the prospect of termination
to influence AO decisions if AOs are appointed and removed by an external
authority. Thus, this paper argues that IRS AOs meet the necessary
requirements to be classified as inferior Officers under the Appointments
Clause and therefore should be appointed by a Court of law for reasons of
impartiality.

1. Public confidence in the IRS has generally fallen. In 2003, 32% of public
respondents reported having little or no confidence in the IRS. In 2013, that number rose to
57% of respondents reporting a lack of confidence in the IRS. Scott Clement, The IRS’
Approval Ratings are Free Fallin’, WASH. POST (May 28, 2013), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/05/28/the-irs-approval-ratings-are-freefallin/?utm_term=.dd383a086a1d.
2. See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46 ADMIN. L.
REV. 271, 280 (1994) (showing that twenty-six percent of ALJs for the SSA perceive agency
pressure to rule differently); see also Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 114-113, §
401(a)(3)(E), 112 Stat. 2242, 3117 (2015) (codified at I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3)(E)) (stating
taxpayers have “the right to appeal a decision of the [IRS] in an independent forum …”)
(emphasis added); see also Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 1001(a)(4), 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (codified
at I.R.C. § 7801) (requiring the Treasury Secretary to “ensure an independent appeals function
within the [IRS]”); see also Bernard Schwartz, Adjudication and the Administrative
Procedures, 32 TUL. L. REV. 203, 207 (1996) (explaining the theory of separation to insulate
the person judging for the agency); see also In Re Larson, 86 A.2d 430, 435 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1952) (“the combination of functions violates the ancient tenet of Anglo-American
justice that ’[n]o man shall be a judge in his own cause.’”).
3. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 912 (1991) (considering the independent
exercise of judicial and executive power to be incongruent).
4. Kent H. Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAN. L. REV. 797, 848 (2013)
[hereinafter ALJ Quandary] (citing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 886
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
5. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138,
3161 (2010); see also Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 515 (1920) (“The power to
remove is, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, an incident of the power to
appoint.”).
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Determining whether a federal actor is an inferior Officer—and thus
subject to the Appointment Clause—entails an in-depth examination of the
position they hold, the office within which they work, and the scope of
authority assigned to them. 6 Therefore, the following section of this paper
discusses the Office of IRS Appeals7 within which AOs perform their central
duties to adjudicate and settle tax liabilities before litigation.8 Understanding
the history and structure of IRS Appeals provides a foundation to better
understand the duties and scope of authority assigned to AOs, which is
necessary to apply the legal framework of the Appointments Clause. That
framework is examined in section three of this paper, which looks at two
Court opinions holding AOs outside the purview of the Appointment Clause.
Those opinions are contradicted by the Supreme Court’s recent holding in
Lucia v. SEC, which builds on prior jurisprudence by clarifying that an
Officer, as defined under the Appointments Clause, need only to have final
decision making authority “in some instances.”9 The Supreme Court’s
analysis in Lucia is applied to AOs in section four of this paper, and section
five provides a series of policy arguments for requiring the application of the
Appointments Clause to AOs. Lastly, section six of this paper compares the
possible methods to appoint AOs and argues that appointment by the Courts
is the most method viable for reasons of impartiality.
II. THE STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE OF IRS APPEALS AND
ITS OFFICERS
IRS Appeals has one main purpose: to settle cases before litigation.
AOs were created to assist the Office of Appeals in fulfilling that purpose by
overseeing all administrative appeals, and ultimately deciding whether or not
to compromise the liability in question. To fully understand the role of an
IRS Appeals Officer, it is necessary to understand the structure and purpose
of IRS Appeals. After all, the authority of an AO is limited to the authority
delegated to the Office of Appeals. This section provides an overview of
why IRS Appeals was created, its initial authority, and the evolution and
scope of its role within the IRS. This examination, in turn, will establish a

6. See generally Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (holding SEC ALJs subject to
the Appointment’s Clause because they held offices established by law and wielded
significant authority).
7. The IRS Office of Appeals is also referred to as “Office of Appeals,” “IRS Appeals,”
or “Appeals Office.”
8. IRS, HISTORY OF APPEALS, IRS DOC. 7225, at 1 (1987) [hereinafter IRS Doc. 7225].
9. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2066.
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foundation from which to better understand the role of an AO and the
authority they wield under the current structure of the IRS.
A. The Creation of IRS Appeals
IRS Appeals has developed alongside the US Tax Court, which
traces back to the Committee on Appeals and Review (the Committee). The
Committee was created in 1918 by the IRS Commissioner as means to
adjudicate tax controversy within the IRS.10 The Committee, however, had
only limited authority to settle cases. For example, it was “directly
responsible to the Commissioner and could act only in an advisory capacity.
Thus, the Commissioner was theoretically free to disregard Committee
recommendations.”11 The Commissioner’s restraint over Committee
recommendations was ultimately removed by the Revenue Act of 1921;12
which made two additional contributions to the appeals process. First, the
1921 Act afforded appeal rights to all taxpayers.13 Second, the Act granted
the Committee final decision making authority over such appeals.14 The Act
effectively increased the number of annual appeals and caused the
Committee to significantly expand, nearly quadrupling in size over a twoyear period.15 However, the Committee’s expansion was not enough to
handle the appeal load, which ultimately lead to the Committee being
replaced by the Board of Tax Appeals, in 1924.16
Two major issues led to the replacement of the Committee. First,
the Committee was not independent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.17
The Tax Simplification Board18 reviewed this issue and found that “it would
never be possible to give to the taxpayer the fair and independent review to
which [she is rightly entitled] as long as the appellate tribunal is directly
10. The Committee was the first adjudicatory body created by the Commissioner and
organized within the IRS. See 1920 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 14–15.
11. Harold Dubroff & Brant J. Hellwig, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS, 42–45 (2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter Historical Analysis] (“The Solicitor
of Internal Revenue reviewed Committee decisions on behalf of the Commissioner and
readily exercised authority to amend or reverse them.”); see also REPORT OF TAX
SIMPLIFICATION BOARD, H.R. DOC. NO. 68-103, at 2 (1923).
12. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, ch. 136, § 250(d), 42 Stat. 227, 265.
13. Id. § 1309, 42 Stat. 310.
14. Id.
15. Historical Analysis, supra note 11, at 43.
16. COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 11 (1924).
17. See A.E. Graupner, The Operation of the Board of Tax Appeals, 3 NAT’L INC. TAX
MAG. 295 (1925) (describing the issue that Committee recommendations were mere
settlements of disputed issues rather than judicial determinations of legal questions).
18. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, ch. 136, § 1327, 42 Stat. 317 (creating the
Tax Simplification Board to investigate the administration of the internal revenue laws).
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under, and its recommendations subject to the approval of, the [O]fficer
whose duty it is to administer the law and collect the tax.”19 A second flaw
was the Committee’s lack of procedural due process. The informal and
private nature of Committee hearings allowed taxpayers to settle liabilities
behind closed doors.20 These private hearings encouraged inconsistent
settlements resulting in large refunds to some taxpayers but not others.21
This led to public demands for more transparency and “equal applicability
of the law” within the appeals process.22
Congress addressed public concerns by creating more formal appeal
procedures in the 1924 Revenue Act.23 The Act replaced the Committee with
the Board of Tax Appeals (the Board), an “independent executive branch
agency that would later evolve into the U.S. Tax Court.”24 The Board was
analogous to a judicial forum, with appointments made by the President of
United States.25 However, the Board’s decisions were “not final on the
question of liability.”26 Thus, the Government could appeal unfavorable
decisions to Federal Court.27 Importantly, the Board had formal procedures.
These included public hearings with written findings of fact, and even
written opinions.28 The Board’s formal procedures, however, slowed the
appeals process.29
To expedite the tax appeals process, the IRS Commissioner formed
an independent Special Advisory Committee in 1927 that would later evolve
into IRS Appeals.30 The Advisory Committee “functioned essentially as a
settlement agency exercising the discretion vested in the Commissioner.”31
19. 1924 COMM’R OF INTL. REV. ANN. REP. 12; see also 65 CONG. REC. 2614, 2684
(1924) (remarks of Mr. Young).
20. Historical Analysis, supra note 11, at 47.
21. See, e.g., Sully, Those Refunded Millions, SATURDAY EVENING POST, June 21, 1924,
at 36.
22. Historical Analysis, supra note 11, at 47 (“The creation of the board represented a
victory for those forces of righteousness demanding absolute precision and equal applicability
of the law without fear or favor.”).
23. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §1100(a), 43 Stat. 253.
24. Andrew Strekla & Sean Morrison, The IRS and America’s Longest Running ADR
Program, FED. L. PUB., Nov. 2016 at 28.
25. Historical Analysis, supra note 11, at 63.
26. Id. at 122.
27. Id. at 56.
28. Historical Analysis, supra note 11, at 93 (clarifying that written opinions were
required for cases involving more than $10,000).
29. National Archives, Record of the Treasury Dep’t, Record Group 56, Tax – Board of
Tax Appeals 1923. “The board [had] more cases to pass on and less informal practice, and,
therefore, greater delay upon each case than [the Committee].”
30. Strekla & Morrison, supra note 24, at 28.
31. Id.
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The Advisory Committee had limited authority,32 and its procedures were
informal, allowing taxpayers to petition without fear of technical
objections.33 In 1933, the Advisory Committee was replaced by a group
known as Technical Staff, which was given increased authority to settle
cases.34 Specifically, Technical Staff “had the authority to bind the IRS in
matters of $5,00035 or less for any one tax year.”36 The Technical Staff went
through several reorganizations, each increasing in authority throughout
time.37 Finally, in 1978 the IRS Appeals Division was created.38
B. The Current Structure of IRS Appeals
The structure of IRS Appeals (hereafter Appeals or Office of
Appeals) was first described in Rev. Proc. 78-1,39 and was further defined by
Treasury Regulations in 1987.40 Throughout its history, the structure of IRS
Appeals has emphasized the informal nature of its proceedings.41 For
example, the regulations make clear that testimony is not taken under oath,
and matters alleged as facts are taken as such.42 Importantly, IRS Appeals
has exclusive and final authority to determine liability for most taxes at the
administrative level.43 This authority also includes complete settlement

32. See IRS Doc. 7225, supra note 8, at 1 (clarifying the Special Advisory Committee
could review cases only where a notice of deficiency had been issued).
33. Strekla & Morrison, supra note 24, at 29.
34. IRS Doc. 7225, supra note 8, at 1.
35. See CPI Inflation Calculator, Bureau of Labor Statics, for calculation that 5,000 in
1933 is equivalent to $97,377.13 in 2018 U.S. dollars, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_cal
culator.htm (last visited 2/9/2019).
36. Strekla & Morrison, supra note 24, at 28.
37. Id. (“Technical Staff became ‘the Appellate Division’ in 1952, and as the
jurisdiction of the Appellate Division increased, its employees changed titles from ‘technical
advisors’ to ‘appellate conferees,’ and finally to the current title of ‘appeals officers’ in
1978.”).
38. Id.
39. REV. PROC. 78-1, C.B. 550 (1978).
40. See Treas. Reg. § 601.106.
41. Id. (clarifying that no testimony is taken under oath).
42. Treas. Reg. § 601.106(c).
43. Treas. Reg. § 601.106(d)(2)(ii). See also James E. Merritt, How to Handle a Tax
Controversy at the IRS and in Court. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (October, 1996) and
I.R.S. PUB. NO. 556 (clarifying that to receive attorney fees, the taxpayer must “apply for
administrative costs within 90 days of the date on which the final decision of the IRS Office
of Appeals … was mailed to you.”) (emphasis added).
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powers.44 Under this broad authority, IRS Appeals is able to accomplish its
mission to settle tax liabilities before litigation.45
Initially, IRS Appeals was not acknowledged by statute.46 It was
instead recognized only by Treasury Regulations, Revenue Procedures, and
the IRS Manual.47 That all changed when Congress passed the Restructuring
and Reform Act (RRA), in 1998.48 The RRA responded to public requests
for a more taxpayer-centered appeals process by establishing broad statutory
rights of appeal.49 The Act addressed public concern in two ways. First, the
Act directed the Treasury Secretary to “ensure an independent appeals
function” within the IRS, including a “prohibition of ex parte
communications between AOs and other Internal Revenue Service
employees.”50 This effectively echoed the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights, which,
under Section 7803, granted taxpayers a “right to appeal a decision of the
IRS in an independent forum.”51 IRS Appeals was restructured within the
RRA to be that “independent” forum.52 The impartial and independent
nature of IRS Appeals has since been reiterated within numerous IRS
publications and statutes.53
Second, the RRA granted taxpayers a statutory right of appeal,
otherwise referred to as a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing, “which
allow[s] taxpayers to appeal lien, levy, or seizure actions proposed by the
IRS.”54 Under the RRA, CDP hearings were to be conducted within IRS
Appeals.55 The RRA further allowed IRS Appeals to “retain jurisdiction with
44. See MICHAEL SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, ¶9.01[2] (2nd ed. 2002).
See also Treas. Reg. § 601.106(a)(1)(i) (“The Appeals office will have exclusive settlement
jurisdiction … over cases docketed in the Tax Court.”).
45. IRS Doc. 7225, supra note 8, at 7.
46. See SALTZMAN, supra note 44 (clarifying that vague references to an appeal unit
could be found in I.R.C. § 7429, which called for review of jeopardy assessments in localized
offices. Other references are found in I.R.C. § 7430, which permits taxpayers to recover
litigation costs after the taxpayer exhausts all administrative remedies).
47. Id.
48. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105206, 112 Stat. 685 [hereinafter RAA].
49. See SALTZMAN, supra note 44.
50. RRA, supra note 48, at §1001.
51. I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3)(E).
52. RRA, supra note 48, at § 1001(a)(4).
53. Your Rights as a Taxpayer, IRS Pub. No. 1, 64731W, at 1 (2017) (“Taxpayers are
entitled to a fair and impartial administrative appeal of most IRS decisions …”) (emphasis
added). See also I.R.C. § 7122(e)(1) (entitling taxpayers to “an independent administrative
review of any rejection of a proposed offer-in-compromise …”) (emphasis added).
54. S. Rep. No. 105-174 at 92, (1998).
55. I.R.C. § 6320(b) (giving IRS Appeals the authority to oversee all taxpayer appeals
against notices of intent to file a lien); I.R.C. § 6330(b) (giving IRS Appeals the authority to
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respect to any determination made,”56 and even authorized IRS Appeals to
settle matters on docket before the U.S. Tax Court.57 Importantly, the RRA
required all CDP hearings to be conducted by an “[i]mpartial officer … who
has had no prior involvement with respect to the [contested matter].”58 Those
“[i]mpartial officer[s]” are referred to as “[A]ppeals [O]fficers.”59
C. The Scope and Authority of IRS Appeal Officers
All CDP hearings conducted within IRS Appeals are heard by an
IRS AO.60 The AO position has existed in one form or another long before
the RRA.61 However, the RRA codified the authority for Appeals Officers
under IRC Sections 6330 and 6320. Those statutes make clear that AOs are
to be the aforementioned “impartial officers” tasked with conducting CDP
hearings.62 AOs are also vested with exclusive authority to determine tax
liability,63 issue notices of deficiencies,64 and even settle cases on behalf of
the IRS Commissioner.65
Within the broad scope of authority given to AOs there are certain
statutorily mandated duties. First, before issuing any final determination as
to liability after conducting a CDP hearing, “[t]he [AO] shall at the hearing
obtain verification from the Secretary that the requirements of any applicable
law or administrative procedure have been met.”66 Second, AOs must
consider all relevant issues raised by the taxpayer in the hearing, including
spousal defenses,67 the appropriateness of collection actions,68 as well as any
alternatives to collections.69 Third, in making a determination, the AO must
oversee all appeals of levy notices); I.R.C. § 7122(e) (giving statutory right to taxpayers to
appeal any denied Offer in Compromise).
56. I.R.C. § 6330(d)(3).
57. See Treas. Reg. § 601.106(a)(1)(i).
58. I.R.C. §§ 6330(b)(3), 6320(b)(2).
59. I.R.C. §§ 6330(c)(1), 6330(c)(3).
60. See I.R.C. §§ 6330(c)(1) and 6330(c)(3) (The [AO] shall at the [CDP] hearing obtain
verification from the Secretary that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative
procedure have been met.”).
61. IRS Doc. 7225, supra note 8, at 5 (explaining that “[i]n 1965, the name of settlement
officer was changed from ‘Technical Advisor’ to ‘Appellate Conferee.’ It was subsequently
changed to ‘Appeals Officer’ in October of 1978.”).
62. See I.R.C. §§ 6320(b)(3), 6330(b)(3), 6330(c)(1)-(3).
63. Treas. Reg. § 601.106(d)(2)(ii).
64. Id.
65. Treas. Reg. § 601.106(a)(1)(i).
66. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(1).
67. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(A)(i).
68. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(A)(ii).
69. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(A)(iii).
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consider “whether any proposed collection action balances the need for the
efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the person that
any collection action be no more intrusive than necessary.”70
Although taxpayers may petition Tax Court to review an AO
determination, 71 it is often necessary for taxpayers to first bring their case
before an AO as a prerequisite to bringing their case before Tax Court. One
example is where a taxpayer wants to qualify for an award of attorney fees.72
To qualify, the taxpayer must first exhaust all administrative remedies,
including their right to a CDP hearing before an AO.73 Another example is
where the taxpayer received no deficiency notice, which is required to
petition Tax Court for review.74 Specifically, where no deficiency notice is
received,75 the taxpayer must first request a CDP hearing to receive a formal
deficiency notice from an AO.76 Thus, AOs often act as the “gatekeepers” to
Tax Court because they are authorized to determine liability and issue
deficiency notices, which are prerequisites for Tax Court jurisdiction.77
Because of this broad authority, some taxpayers have argued that AOs wield
too much power to be considered mere employees, and should instead be
considered Officers of the United States, which are subject to appointment
under the U.S. Constitution.78
III. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
This section provides an overview of the scope of the Appointments
Clause and its prior application to AOs by the Courts. This cursory overview
will, in turn, provide a foundation to better understand the recent expansion
of Appointment Clause jurisprudence, which is discussed in Part C of this
Section, and the effects of that expansion to IRS AOs, which is discussed in
section four of this paper.
70. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(3)(C).
71. I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1).
72. See generally I.R.C. § 7430.
73. I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii), and Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-1(b).
74. I.R.C. § 6213(a).
75. See generally I.R.C. § 6511(a)-(b) (Taxpayers can sometimes receive no deficiency
notice when contesting denials of claims for refund.)
76. Treas. Reg. § 601.106(d)(2)(ii) (stating, in part, that “[AOs] having authority for the
administrative determination of tax liabilities … are also authorized to prepare, sign on behalf
of the Commissioner, and send to the taxpayer by registered or certified mail any statutory
notice of deficiency prescribed …”).
77. See I.R.C. § 6212 (A statutory notice of deficiency is sometimes referred to
informally as a taxpayer’s “ticket to Tax Court.”).
78. See, e.g., Tucker v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 114, 166 (2010), and Tucker v. Comm’r, 676
F.3d 1129, 1132 (2012) (considering IRS AOs not to be Officers under the U.S. Constitution).
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A. The Scope of the Appointments Clause
Simply stated, the Appointments Clause requires Officers of the United
States to be appointed.79 This means such Officers can be hired and fired
only as directed by Article II.80 Under Article II, principal Officers are
appointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate,81 and
inferior Officers82 are appointed by the President alone, a Court, or a
Department Head.83 In discussing the scope of the Appointments Clause,
and how it applies to AOs, this paper focuses only on the scope and definition
of inferior Officers.84 This is because, by definition, inferior Officers answer
to other appointed Officers, whereas principal Officers answer only to the
President.85 Thus, if the Appointments Clause were to apply to AOs, they
would not be considered principal Officers because AOs answer to other
Officers, not to the President. Instead, if AOs were subject to the
Appointments Clause, they would fall under the scope and definition of an
inferior Officer (hereon referred to simply as “Officer”).86
79. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
80. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 126 (1926) (“In the absence of any specific
provision to the contrary, the power of appointment to executive office carries with it, as a
necessary incident, the power of removal …”), and United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483,
285 (1886) (stating that “Congress [has] the power to limit and regulate removal of such
inferior officers by heads of departments when it exercises its constitutional power to lodge
the power of appointment with them.”).
81. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 716 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (defining an
Officer who answers directly to the President as a principle Officer).
82. Id. (defining an Officer who answers to another appointed Officer as an inferior
Officer); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 510
(2010) (stating “inferior [o]fficers are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some
level by other [o]fficers …”).
83. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 at 126 (1976), superseded by statue, The Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub.L. No. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81 as recognized in
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 93 (2003); see also Freytag v. Comm’r,
501 U.S. 868, 915 (1991) (defining a department as a “free standing, self-contained entity in
the Executive Branch.”); see also John T. Plecnik, Officers Under the Appointments Clause,
11. PITT. TAX. REV. 201, 203 (2014) (a department head includes the Treasury Secretary but
not the IRS Commissioner).
84. See generally Morrison, 487 U.S. at 716 (discussing the differences between inferior
and principal Officers).
85. Id.
86. See Tucker, 135 T.C. at 165-66 (supporting the proposition that AOs cannot be
considered principal Officers because AOs answer to the Chief Counsel and Assistant Chief
Counsel of the IRS) (“[N]o CDP determination is issued until it has been reviewed and
approved by a higher-ranking team manager.”); see also 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(1) (“The appeals
officer shall at the hearing obtain verification from the Secretary that the requirements of any
applicable law or administrative procedure have been met.”).
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Distinguishing Officers from mere employees is an essential first step
to applying the Appointment’s Clause because employees do not require
appointment.87 Employees are defined as “lesser functionaries subordinate
to [O]fficers of the United States.”88 T he Supreme Court has, over the years,
defined certain characteristics necessary for an employee to be considered
an Officer subject to the Appointments Clause.89 Those characteristics are
conveniently distilled within a two-factor test.90 In other words, to be subject
to the Appointments Clause, an Officer must maintain a “continuing office
established by law” and, in addition, must “wield significant authority.”91
An Officer maintains a “continuing office” when “they serve on an
ongoing, rather than a temporary or episodic basis,” and their “duties, salary,
and means of appointment are all specified [by law].”92 This first factor was
examined by the Supreme Court in United States v. Germaine.93 There, the
Supreme Court held that “civil surgeons” were mere employees because
their duties were occasional or temporary rather than “continuing and
permanent.”94 Importantly, the surgeons in Germaine acted only when
called on by the Commissioner of Pensions.95 In addition, the surgeons made
no oath for office, nor were any appropriations made to pay their
compensation.96 Thus, the Supreme Court held that civil surgeons did not
maintain a “continuing office” because their positions were temporary and
they did not receive statutorily defined duties, salary or means of
appointment.97
As for the second factor within the two-factor test, the Appointments
Clause requires Officers to wield “significant authority.”98 The Supreme
Court has found “significant authority” where an Officer has the power to
issue final decisions,99 and where an Officer has unfettered use of
discretion.100 Importantly, an Officer will not be removed of their Officer
87. See Plecnik, supra note 83, at 203 (discussing the application of the Appointments
Clause to federal employees).
88. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 125-26.
89. Id. (clarifying that Officers hold positions that “[do] not include all employees …”).
90. Lucia, 138 S.Ct. at 2049 (applying most recently the two-factor Officer test to SEC
ALJs).
91. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 159.
92. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
93. United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 512 (1878).
94. Id. at 510.
95. Id. at 512.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 159 (2010).
99. See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1133-34 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
100. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882.
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status for occasionally performing employee duties.101 In other words, an
Officer will not be considered an “[O]fficer for purposes of some of their
duties… but mere employees with respect to other responsibilities.”102
Therefore, in determining whether an employee wields the necessary
authority to be considered an Officer subject to appointment, prior Courts
look at all the duties assigned to the employee in question.103
B. Prior Application of the Appointments Clause to Appeals Officers
Because Courts apply the Appointments Clause on a case-by-case
basis,104 it is important to understand how prior Courts have specifically
applied the Appointments Clause to AOs. This section provides an analysis
of two prior Court opinions that considered AOs “mere employees” who are
outside the scope of the Appointments Clause. Those cases are Tucker I and
Tucker II.105
1. Tucker I
The Tax Court first looked at whether AOs were Officers subject to the
Appointments Clause in Tucker v. CIR (Tucker I).106 There, the Court held
that AOs were not subject to appointment because, among other reasons,
they did not wield significant authority.107 Tucker I involved a taxpayer who
appealed an IRS notice of intent to file a lien to collect unpaid taxes.108 The
taxpayer’s appeal was granted and a CDP hearing was held by an AO.109 The
AO sustained the notice of intent to file a lien, from which the taxpayer
appealed to Tax Court on constitutional grounds, arguing that the AO who

101. Id. (stating that where an “[O]fficer on occasion performs duties that may be
performed by an employee not subject to the Appointments Clause does not transform [her]
status under the Constitution”).
102. Id.
103. Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1132 (2012) (“[W]e look not only to the authority that Appeals
employees wielded in [Petitioner’s] case but to all their duties …”). See also Free Enterprise
Fund, 561 U.S. at 520 (2010) (“[T]he Court in these circumstances has looked to function and
context, and not to bright-line rules.”) (Breyer J., dissenting).
104. Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 539 (stating “I understand the virtues of a
common-law case-by-case approach” to applying the Appointments Clause to inferior
Officers) (Breyer J., dissenting).
105. See generally Tucker, 135 T.C. 114 (2010); Tucker, 676 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
106. Tucker, 135 T.C. 114 (2010).
107. Id. at 165.
108. Id. at 116.
109. Id.
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handled his administrative appeal was required to be appointed.110 The Tax
Court heard the appeal, applied the two-part “Officer” test, and held that an
AO “has neither a position ‘established by [l]aw’ nor ‘significant authority’
that is characteristic of an ‘[O]fficer of the United States’ for purposes of the
Appointments Clause.”111
In examining the first factor of the two-part test, the Tax Court
concluded that “no [AO] position [was] established by law.”112 Despite AOs
having duties and salary specified by law, the Tax Court considered such
specified duties, salary, and means of appointment as non-determinative for
purposes of meeting the first factor. Specifically, the Court stated that such
specified duties and salary are only “a factor that has proven relevant under
the Supreme Court’s Appointments Clause jurisprudence.”113 Instead, the
Tax Court found that Appeals Officers did not hold offices established by
law because the IRS Office of Appeals, within which AOs perform their
duties, was created by an Executive order with statutory authority.114 The
Court stated that “[i]f there were a statutory provision to the effect that
‘[t]here shall be, within the IRS Office of Appeals, officers designated as
Appeals Officers, who shall conduct CDP hearings,’ etc. . . then that would
be some indication that the Appeals Officer Position was [e]stablished by
[l]aw.”115 The Tax Court supported their conclusion by looking at the
statutory language within I.R.C. Sections 6320 and 6330, which specify
duties for the AO position.116 Those statutes refer specifically to AOs as
either an “[O]fficer or employee.” The Court concluded that, “[i]f Congress
had intended to assign CDP duty to a particular rank of “Appeals Officer,”
it would not have added the phrase “or employee.”117 Lastly, the Court found
that no Appeals Office was established by Treasury Regulations,118 however
the Court did not examine any Treasury Regulations during its analysis.119

110. Id.
111. Id. at 165.
112. Id. at 152.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 153.
115. Id. (“It was the Executive Branch that created the IRS Office of Appeals and its
personnel structure, pursuant to that authority in [S]ection 7804(a).”).
116. See generally I.R.C. § 6320 (2019); I.R.C § 6330 (2019).
117. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 154 (2010).
118. Id. at 159 (“[E]ven under the regulations the CDP responsibility does not inhere in
any specific office or position.”).
119. Id. at 158-59.
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Despite finding that the AO “positon in question [was] not an office
established by law,”120 the Court went on to assume that the AO position was
established by law, stating:
However, if the phrase “established by [l]aw” were construed to
mean that the Appointments Clause can apply only to a position
expressly created by a statute, then abuses could arise. For example,
Congress could take a pre-existing low-level position (which had
been created by the Executive Branch pursuant to a general
authorization like section 7804(a), and which was not subject to
appointment by the President or a Head of a Department) and could
invest it with significant additional power, thus evading the
Appointments Clause by seeming to avoid “establishing” the
office.121
The Court supported their new position by pointing to cases from the Fifth
and Sixth Circuits, which found an Administrative Review Board (ARB)
employee to be an Officer under the Appointments Clause despite the ARB
being created by order of the Secretary of Labor.122 The Tax Court was
hesitant, but went on to “assume arguendo that the CDP function prescribed
under [S]ections 6320 and 6330 and the regulations thereunder is committed
to a position “established by [l]aw.”123 Considering the first-factor met, the
Court then examined the second factor of whether AOs wield “significant
authority.”124
In examining the second factor, the Court held that AOs do not wield
significant authority because they do not make final decisions.125 The Court
supported their determination by citing Landry.126 There, the Court stated in
dicta that adjudicative positions do not have final decision making power
where their “determinations are subject to supervision.”127 In Landry, the
120. Id. at 158
121. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 158.
122. Id. at 157 (referring to Willy v. Admin. Rev. Bd., 423 F.3d 483, 491 (5th Cir. 2005)),
and Varnadore v. Sec. of Labor, 141 F.3d 625, 631 (6th Cir.1998) (finding an Administrative
Review Board (ARB) member to be an inferior Officer under the Appointments Clause
despite the ARB being created by order of the Secretary of Labor).
123. Id. at 158-9 (“Rather, the parties and the [C]ourts seem to have assumed that if the
positions existed, then the positions were established by law. If this assumption is correct,
then it would seem that any “Office” that actually existed in the Federal Government is
arguably established by law.”).
124. Id. at 160.
125. Id. at 161.
126. Id. (citing Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133-1134).
127. Id. at 163 (citing Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133-1134).
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DC Court of Appeals held the administrative law judges (ALJs) in
question128 did not exercise significant authority because their decisions were
subject to agency review and were thus not final.129 The Tax Court in Tucker
applied the same analysis to IRS AOs and found they were not vested with
“independent authority” because their decisions were subject to approval by
the Office of Appeals, which “retains jurisdiction to reconsider and overturn
its personnel’s determinations with respect to a collection action.”130 Thus,
according to the court, because AOs do not have final decision making
power, they do not wield significant authority.131
2. Tucker II.
The taxpayer in Tucker I appealed the Tax Court decision to the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals. The Circuit Court upheld the Tax Court decision,
finding AOs outside the purview of the Appointments Clause.132 However,
the Circuit Court did not take a decisive position on whether AOs maintain
continuing positions under law. Specifically, the court stated “we first
consider – and ultimately bypass – whether, in the words of the clause, [AO]
positions were established by law.”133 Although, in bypassing the first
factor, the Court stated that it would seem “anomalous if the Appointments
Clause were inapplicable to positions extant in the bureaucratic hierarchy,
and to which Congress assigned ‘significant authority,’ merely because
neither Congress nor the [E]xecutive branch had formally created the
positions.”134 The Court quickly added that, “[i]n any event, because we
conclude below that [AOs] do not exercise significant authority within the
meaning of the Appointments Clause cases, we need not resolve whether
their positions were ‘established by [l]aw’ for purposes of that clause.”135
The Court then examined the “significance” of AO authority.
In holding that AOs do not wield significant authority, the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals looked at three criteria: the significance of the matters
resolved by AOs, the discretion they exercise in reaching their decision, and
the finality of those decisions.136 The Court did not quibble over the first
128. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1128 (In Landry, the ALJs in question adjudicated on behalf of
the Federal Deposited Insurance Corporation (FDIC)).
129. Id. at 1133.
130. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 164 (referencing 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(2)).
131. Id.
132. Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1133.
133. Id. at 1132.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1133.
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criterion. Instead, the Court took as fact “that the issue of a person's tax
liability is substantively significant enough to meet [the first factor], in which
case degrees of discretion and finality will ultimately be determinative.”137
In examining the second criterion, the court found the discretion exercised
by AOs to be constrained because there are limitations on the settlement
amounts on which they can agree.138 For example, “if Appeals estimates that
the IRS’s chances of prevailing on a disputed point of law are 60%, [an AO]
may agree to accept only 60% of the liability that turns on the point.”139 The
court also noted that AO discretion is constrained because they are instructed
to “[r]equest legal advice from an Associate Chief Counsel office on novel
or significant issues.”140 Further, the Court noted that AOs must receive
approval from Treasury’s General Counsel for any compromise exceeding
$50,000,141 and any closing agreement relieving a taxpayer of a liability is
subject to approval by the Treasury Secretary.142 For these reasons, the
Tucker II Court found the discretion of an AO to be “highly constrained.”143
Lastly, the court examined the final decision making authority of AOs.
However, the Court avoided an in-depth analysis. Specifically, the Court
“conclude[d] that the [AOs] lack of discretion [was] determinative,
offsetting the effective finality of [their] decisions …”144 The Court reasoned
that, “if the tasks assigned [to] a position allowed the holder no choice,
obviously, it would be pointless to classify [her] as an “Officer” even though
the consequences of [her] ministerial decisions were both vital and final.”145
Thus, the Court concluded that “the significance and discretion involved in
[AO] decisions seem well below the level necessary to [consider them] an
Officer.”146

137. Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1133.
138. Id. at 1134 (“[An AO] is subject to consultation requirements, to guidelines, and to
supervision.”).
139. Id. (citing C.F.R. § 601.106(f)(2)).
140. Id. (citing I.R.M. pt. 8.6.3.5 (Oct. 26, 2007)).
141. Id. (citing U.S.C. § 7122(b)).
142. Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1134.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1135 (internal quotations omitted).
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C. Recent Additions to the Appointments Clause Jurisprudence
In 2018, the Supreme Court decided Lucia v. SEC,147 which effectively
redefines essential features of the Appointments Clause analysis relied on by
both the Tucker I and Tucker II Courts. (i.e., Tax Court and D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals, respectively). In Lucia, Petitioner marketed a retirement
savings strategy called “Buckets of Money.”148 The SEC considered
Petitioner’s business strategy deceitful and charged Petitioner under the
Investment Advisors Act.149 An ALJ for the SEC concluded that Petitioner
had violated the Investment Advisors Act.150 Petitioner appealed the ALJs
decision arguing it was invalid because the SEC’s ALJ was not
constitutionally appointed under the Appointments Clause.151 Petitioner’s
appeal was granted certiorari, and the Supreme Court applied the two-factor
test to determine whether SEC ALJs are Officers under the Constitution.152
The Supreme Court cited their opinions in Freytag and Germaine153 to
establish the first-factor, that Officers, as defined under the Appointments
Clause, must “hold a continuing office established by law.”154 In Freytag,
the Supreme Court found that Special Trial Judges (STJs) of the US Tax
Court had continuing positions because “they serve on an ongoing, rather
than a temporary or episodic basis, and their duties, salary, and means of
appointment are all specified in the Tax Code.”155 The Supreme Court
compared the duties and statutory authority of SEC ALJs to the STJs in
Freytag and found that SEC ALJs, like Tax Court STJs, receive career
appointments to statutorily created positions, and therefore hold a
“continuing office established by law.”156 Thus, the first factor was met.
In examining the second-factor, the Supreme Court cited their holding
in Freytag to establish that Officers, as defined under the Appointment
Clause, must wield significant authority.157 In Freytag, the Supreme Court
held that Special Trial Judges (STJs) of the US Tax Court wielded significant
147. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. 2044.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2050.
151. Id. at 2051.
152. Id. at 2051.
153. Germaine, 99 U.S. at 510.
154. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2047 (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881).
155. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
156. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2047 (“The Commission’s ALJs, like the Tax Court’s STJs, hold
a continuing office established by law. SEC ALJs receive a career appointment… to a position
created by statute . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. Id. at 2053 (“Freytag says everything necessary to decide this case.”).
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authority under law.158 There, the Government attempted to equate
“significant authority” with the authority to issue final decisions.159
Specifically, the Government argued “that STJs are employees in all cases
in which they could not enter a final decision.”160 The Government supported
their argument by pointing to specific cases where STJs lacked final
decision-making authority.161 The Freytag Court, however, disagreed with
the Government’s position and pointed to instances where STJs could issue
final decisions.162 Importantly, the Court stated:
[STJs] are not inferior officers for purposes of some of their duties
… but mere employees with respect to other responsibilities. The
fact that an inferior [O]fficer on occasion performs duties that may
be performed by an employee not subject to the Appointments
Clause does not transform [her] status under the Constitution. If a
special trial judge is an inferior [O]fficer for purposes of [some
duties, she] is an inferior officer within the meaning of the
Appointments Clause and must be properly appointed.163
In determining that SEC ALJs wielded “significant authority,” the
Supreme Court in Lucia compared the SEC’s ALJs to the STJs in Freytag.164
Similar to the Tax Court’s STJs, the ALJs in Lucia could only “issue initial
decisions containing factual findings, legal conclusions and appropriate
remedies.”165 These initial decisions were reviewable and potentially
dismissible by the SEC, but if the SEC opted against review, it would issue

158. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882.
159. Id. at 881 (“The Commissioner reasons that special trial judges may be deemed
employees in subsection (b)(4) cases because they lack authority to enter a final decision.”).
160. Id. at 881-82; see also, Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2048 (holding SEC ALJs to wield
significant authority where the SEC had the power to adopt the ALJs opinion as final or ignore
it entirely).
161. Id. at 874 (“Petitioners appear not to appreciate the distinction between the [STJ’s]
authority to hear cases and prepare proposed findings and opinions under subsection (b)(4)
and their lack of authority actually to decide those cases, which is reserved exclusively for
judges of the Tax Court.”).
162. Id. at 873.
163. Id. at 882.
164. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2047–48 (“Freytag’s analysis decides this case. The
Commission's ALJs, like the Tax Court's STJs, hold a continuing office established by law …
and they exercise the same “significant discretion” when carrying out the same “important
functions” as STJs do.”).
165. Id. at 2048 (“SEC ALJs issue decisions much like that in Freytag. STJs prepare
proposed findings and an opinion adjudicating charges and assessing tax liabilities.”).
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an order making the initial decision final.166 In comparing SEC ALJs to Tax
Court STJs, the Lucia Court stated:
[a] regular Tax Court judge must always review a STJ's opinion.
And that opinion counts for nothing unless the regular judge adopts
it as his own. By contrast, the SEC can decide against reviewing an
ALJ decision at all. And when the SEC declines review (and issues
an order saying so), the ALJ's decision itself ‘becomes final’ and is
deemed the action of the Commission.167
As stated by the Lucia Court, “that last word capacity makes this an a
fortiori case: If the Tax Court’s STJs are [O]fficers, as Freytag held, then the
Commission’s ALJs must be too.”168
In addition to determining that SEC ALJs have final-decision making
authority, the ALJs were also found “to exercise the same ‘significant
discretion’ when carrying out the same ‘important functions’ as [the Tax
Court’s] STJs.” The Lucia Court examined specific duties assigned to the
ALJs, which included the administration of hearings,169 and the issuance of
decisions setting out “findings and conclusions about all material issues of
fact and law … includ[ing] the appropriate order, sanction, relief, or denial
thereof.”170 The Court considered these important functions to be “much like
that in Freytag—except with potentially more independent effect. As the
Freytag Court recounted, STJs ‘prepare prosed findings and an opinion’
adjudicating charges and assessing tax liabilities. Similarly, the
Commissions ALJs issue decisions containing factual findings, legal
conclusions, and appropriate remedies.”171 In the Courts eyes, these
important functions were “sufficient to make someone an [O]fficer of the
United States.”172

166. Id. at 2046 (“The Commission can review that decision, but if it opts against review,
it issues an order that the initial decision has become final.”).
167. Id. at 2053-54.
168. Id. at 2054, 2067 (“[A] prerequisite to officer status is the authority, in at least some
instances, to issue final decisions that bind the Government or third parties.”) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
169. Id. at 2049 (Hearings include “supervising discovery; issuing, revoking, or
modifying subpoenas; deciding motions; ruling on the admissibility of evidence;
administering oaths; hearing and examining witnesses; generally regulating the course of the
proceeding and the conduct of the parties and their counsel; and imposing sanctions for
contemptuous conduct or violations of procedural requirements.”).
170. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2049.
171. Id. at 2053.
172. Id. at 2056.
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IV.THE APPLICATION OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE TO
AOS AFTER LUCIA
This section applies to AOs the two-part test used by the Courts in
Tucker I and Tucker II, but further incorporates the additional analysis
provided by the Supreme Court in Lucia. The Lucia Court considered SEC
ALJs to be Officers despite their opinions being subject to oversight and
potential dismissal by higher ranking Officers, a quality that the Courts in
Tucker I and Tucker II found fatal to an Officer status determination under
the Appointments Clause. This section, therefore, explores how the holding
and analysis in Lucia differs from the reasoning employed by the Courts in
Tucker I and Tucker II, and further explains how the Lucia Court’s
application of the Appointments Clause to SEC ALJs affects IRS AOs.
A. The Changes Brought by the Lucia Decision to Appointments
Clause Jurisprudence
The Lucia Court’s holding effectively modifies the analysis employed
by the Courts in Tucker I and Tucker II to determine Officer status under the
Appointments Clause. In determining the presence of significant authority,
the Lucia Court found SEC ALJs to have final-decision making powers
despite their determinations being subject to review and potential dismissal
by the SEC Commissioner.173 As clarified by the Lucia Court, anytime the
Commissioner forgoes review, “the ALJ's decision itself ‘becomes final’ and
is deemed the action of the Commission.”174 The Court found this “last word
capacity” to be a deciding factor in determining the Officer status of the
ALJs.175 This analysis, however, stands in stark contrast to the analysis
employed by the Courts in Tucker I and Tucker II.
In Tucker I, the Tax Court considered AOs “mere employees” because
their “determinations [were] subject to supervision,” and thus, according to
the Court, they lacked final-decision making capacity.176 The holding and
rationale employed by the Lucia Court, however, effectively rejects this
position. The Lucia opinion stands for the proposition that supervision or
review of a federal actor, in some instances, is not enough to merit employee
status if, in other instances, the federal actor has independent authority to
issue final decisions that bind the government.177 The Lucia Court used the
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 2051.
Id. at 2054.
Id.
Tucker, 135 T.C. at 163 (citing Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133-34 (2000)).
See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2067.
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analysis in Freytag to buttress their conclusion that an Officer will not lose
their “Officer status” in situations where they take-on employee functions.178
That is, SEC ALJs are not employees because their opinions can be reviewed
and dismissed by the Commissioner, they are instead Officers because their
opinions can become final if the Commissioner opts against such review.
The Court in Tucker I failed to give credence to the authority of an AO to
issue final decisions in certain cases. Instead, the Court equated supervision
and oversight with an inability to issue final decisions. That is, Tucker II
held that AOs were employees because their decisions were subject to review
and dismissal by the IRS Commissioner.179 That holding contradicts the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Lucia, which made clear that supervision and
oversight does not strip away Officer status if there are instances where the
federal actor has the authority to issue final decisions that bind the
Government.180 Thus, the analysis employed by Tucker I is no longer good
law after the Supreme Court’s holding in Lucia.
The Lucia holding and rational also frustrate the analysis employed by
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Tucker II. There, the Court considered
AO discretion to be constrained because AOs are “subject to consultation
requirements, to guidelines, and to supervision.”181 For example, the Court
noted that AOs must seek advice for novel issues182 and must receive
approval prior to compromising liabilities above certain amounts.183
However, such constraints are closely reminiscent of the oversight and
supervision discussed in Freytag and Lucia. For example, the STJs in
Freytag had similar constraints in that their proposed opinions were “subject
to review and final decision by a Tax Court judge, regardless of the amount
in issue.”184 Similarly, in Lucia, the determinations made by SEC ALJs were
also subject to review, wherein the Commissioner could “make any findings
or conclusion that in [her] judgement are proper and on the basis of the
record.”185 Despite similar constraints, the Tucker II opinion differed from
178. Id. at n.4 (“And we thought it made no sense to classify the STJs as [O]fficers for
some cases and employees for others.”).
179. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 143-144 (“The IRS [] may re-think the [AO’s] collection
decisions and may take a position—in the litigation or in the settlement of it—that is different
from the position reflected in the Office of Appeals’ CDP determination.”).
180. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2065-66 (“Confirming that final decision making authority is a
prerequisite to officer status would go a long way to aiding Congress and the Executive
Branch in sorting out who is an officer and who is a mere employee.”) (Sotomayor J.,
dissenting).
181. Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1134.
182. I.R.M. § 8.6.3.5.
183. I.R.C. § 7122(b).
184. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 874.
185. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2066.
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the Supreme Court opinion in Lucia and Freytag, in part, because the Court
in Tucker II failed to consider instances where AOs exercise unfettered
discretion. That is, the Tucker II Court ignored an AO’s authority to exercise
complete discretion to bind the IRS in specific cases. The Lucia Court makes
clear that consideration of such discretion and authority is necessary to
determine Officer status under the Appointments Clause.
The Lucia Court clarified “that a perquisite to Officer status is the
authority, in at least some instances, to issue final decisions that bind the
Government or third parties.”186 This prerequisite, employed with the
reasoning set forth by the Supreme Court in Freytag, pushes against the
Tucker II analysis which focused almost entirely on the constrained
discretion of an AO. Specifically, the Freytag Court made clear that a
federal actor, who is an Officer for the purpose of some duties, will not lose
their Officer status by performing employee-like functions in other
instances.187 The Lucia Court further adds that an Officer who has unfettered
discretion and authority, in at least some instances, will not lose their Officer
status in other instances where their discretion and authority is
constrained.188 In other words, Lucia makes clear that any determination of
Officer status requires Courts to look at the discretion and authority of the
federal actor in all instances. The Court’s analysis in Tucker II diverges
from Lucia because, in examining the discretion of an AO, Tucker II severed
away Officer-like duties from employee-like functions. In doing so, the
Court rested its opinion upon the examination of employee functions alone.
Such pointed analysis falls short of what is required under Lucia.
B. Applying the Appointments Clause to AOs After Lucia
As a preliminary matter, prior to applying the Lucia analysis to AOs,
some may argue that the ALJs in Lucia are entirely different from AOs such
that any comparison of the federal actors is without merit. For example, the
ALJs in Lucia, as well as the STJs in Freytag, held positions that conducted
formal adversarial hearings, which are unlike the informal CDP hearings
conducted by AOs.189 There is, however, no common-law basis to support
186. Id. at 2046, 2054, 2066 (clarifying that officers must, in some instances, have
authority to issue final decisions).
187. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882 (stating that Officers will not be considered employees for
some of their duties yet Officers for other duties).
188. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2046 (clarifying that the prospect of review is not enough to
strip an Officer of their Officer status).
189. See Treas. Reg. § 601.106(c) (clarifying the informal nature of CDP hearings in that
no testimony is taken under oath).
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such a position. To the contrary, even the Court in Tucker II stated that “we
do not understand Freytag to suggest that mere informality of proceedings,
or the absence of adversarial procedures, could justify denying ‘Officer’
status to one whose powers would otherwise demand that classification.”190
It would therefore seem that Lucia is not distinguishable based on the
differences between IRS and SEC appeal procedures.
In determining the Officer status of an IRS AO, Lucia requires Courts
to examine instances where AOs exercise significant authority and discretion
to issue final decisions on behalf of the IRS.191 If instances of significant
authority and discretion are present, AOs will not be considered employees
just because there are other instances where their authority is limited or
constrained.192 Instead, under Freytag, Courts must confirm AOs as Officers
under the Appointments Clause where, as clarified by Lucia, there exists
instances of significant authority.
In examining instances of significant authority, AOs are delegated
broad discretionary powers to issue final decisions on behalf of the IRS. In
this vein, there are three such instances. First, AOs are granted complete
“authority to represent the regional commissioner in his/her authority to
settle all cases docketed in the Tax Court and designated for trial at any place
within the territory compromising the region.”193 Second, AOs “may
represent the regional commissioner in his/her exclusive and final authority
for the determination of … tax liability [and] liability for additions to the tax,
additional amounts, and assessable penalties provided under Chapter 68 of
the Code.”194 Third, “[AOs] of the Appeals office having authority for the
administrative determination of tax liabilities … are also authorized to
prepare, sign on behalf of the Commissioner, and send to the taxpayer by
registered or certified mail any statutory notice of deficiency prescribed.”195
An IRS AO thus has exclusive and final authority to act on behalf of
regional commissioners and the IRS Commissioner himself. Even where
constraints are present, in some instances, an AO still has the discretion and
authority to issue final decisions. For example, AOs have broad discretion
in settling tax liability. That is, an AO’s determination to settle liability
190. Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1135.
191. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2046, 2054, 2066 (clarifying that officers must, in some
instances, have authority to issue final decisions).
192. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882 (stating that Officers will not be considered employees for
some of their duties yet Officers for other duties).
193. Treas. Reg. § 601.106(a)(1)(i); see also I.R.M. § 1.2.47.5 (clarifying that regional
commissioners receive appointment and authority delegated by the IRS Commissioner, who
is a principal Officer appointed by the President with Senate consent).
194. Treas. Reg. § 601.106(a)(1)(ii)(c) (emphasis added).
195. Id. § 601.106(d)(ii).
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considers all relevant issues raised by the taxpayer196 and weighs whether the
collection action “balances the need for the efficient collection of taxes with
the legitimate concern of the person that any collection action be no more
intrusive than necessary.”197 Importantly, this determination includes
findings and conclusions about material issues of facts and law. Before any
final determination is made, the AO must “obtain verification from the
Secretary that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative
procedure have been met.”198 Once verification is received, the AOs
decision itself becomes final and is deemed the action of the IRS.199
The holding in Lucia requires AOs to be considered Officers under the
Appointments Clause. In Lucia, the Supreme Court recognized the
constraints placed on SEC ALJs. Specifically, the Court noted that ALJ
opinions were subject to review and potential dismissal by the SEC
Commissioner.200 Despite the presence of this review, according to the Lucia
Court, once the ALJ’s opinion is approved, “the ALJ’s decision itself
‘becomes final’ and is deemed the action of the Commission.”201 The SEC’s
review over its ALJ opinions is similar to the IRS’s review over its AO
determinations. The Treasury Secretary must also review and approve AO
settlement decisions, and once approved, the AO’s decision itself becomes
final and is deemed the action of the IRS. In these instances, AOs are
afforded the discretion and authority to bind the government and third
parties.202 Thus, AOs wield the significant authority necessary for Officer
status under the Appointments Clause, and are therefore required to be
appointed as held by the Supreme Court in Lucia.
It can, however, be argued that Lucia does not change the outcome of
Tucker I and Tucker II because AOs will not meet the first factor of the twofactor test for Officer status. That is, even if there are instances where AOs
wield significant authority, their position is not part of an Office established
196. I.R.C. § 6330(c)(1)-(2)(A).
197. Id. § 6330(c)(3)(C).
198. Id. § 6330(c)(1).
199. Once adopted by the IRS, AO settlement decisions become final and binding; see
I.R.C. § 7122(c) (verifying that offers in compromise are binding on the IRS); see also I.R.S.
PUB. NO. 556 (clarifying that to receive attorney fees, the taxpayer must “apply for
administrative costs within 90 days of the date on which the final decision of the IRS Office
of Appeals … was mailed to you.”) (emphasis added).
200. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2046 (By contrast, the SEC can decide against reviewing an ALJ
decision at all. And when the SEC declines review (and issues an order saying so), the ALJ’s
decision itself becomes final and is deemed the action of the Commission).
201. Id.
202. See generally I.R.C. § 7122; see also Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1 (clarifying that AOs
may compromise cases on behalf of the Treasury Secretary and that compromises are binding
on the IRS and third-parties).
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by law. After all, the Office of Appeals was established by the IRS
Commissioner, not by Congress.203 However, this argument fails on three
counts and potentially a fourth count. First, even if the Office of Appeals
was created through Executive action under statutory authority, there now
exists direct statutory authority for the AO position within the RRA passed
in 1998.204 The statutes therein describe in detail the functions, duties and
scope of authority delegated to AOs.205 Second, as noted by the Court in
Tucker I, prior Courts from the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have considered
positions to be “established by law” where the positions were actually within
an office established by an Executive act under statutory authority.206 Such
precedent applies directly to AOs because they work within the Office of
Appeals, which was established by Executive action under statutory
authority.207 Third, abuse could arise if Officer status is precluded simply
because there is no statutory authority for the position to which the Officer
holds. As stated by the Court in Tucker II, “it would seem anomalous if the
Appointments Clause were inapplicable to positions … to which Congress
assigned ‘significant authority’ merely because neither Congress nor the
[E]xecutive branch had formally created the position.”208 This would
effectively allow Congress to slowly invest a position with significant
authority while evading appointment requirement, which is a scenario the
Appointment Clause is designed to prevent.209 Lastly, if the prior three
responses were to fail, the Taxpayer First Act, which is a proposed Bill, has
the potential to amend I.R.C. Sections 7803 and 7804.210 Among other
changes, the proposed amendments formally establish an “Independent
203. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 135 (“Pursuant to [the] congressional mandate [in § 7804], the
Commissioner established the Office of Appeals and employed personnel to staff that
Office.”).
204. See generally I.R.C. §§ 6330, 6320.
205. Willy, 423 F.3d at 491-92 (5th Cir. 2005); Varnadore, 141 F.3d at 631 (6th Cir.1998)
(finding an Administrative Review Board (ARB) member to be an inferior Officer under the
Appointments Clause despite the ARB being created by order of the Secretary of Labor).
206. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 157 (referring to Willy, 423 F.3d at 491; Varnadore, 141 F.3d at
631 (6th Cir.1998) (finding an Administrative Review Board (ARB) member to be an inferior
Officer under the Appointments Clause despite the ARB being created by order of the
Secretary of Labor)).
207. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 158 (referring to the general power of delegation to the
Commissioner under I.R.C. § 7804(a)).
208. Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1133.
209. Tucker, 135 T.C. at 158 (“For example, Congress could take a pre-existing lowlevel position (which had been created by the Executive Branch pursuant to a general
authorization like section 7804(a), and which was not subject to appointment by the President
or a Head of a Department) and could invest it with significant additional power, thus evading
the Appointments Clause by seeming to avoid “establishing” the office.”).
210. Taxpayer First Act, H.R. 5444, 115th Cong. (as passed by House, Apr. 18, 2018).
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Office of Appeals” within the IRS.211 Thus, if passed by the Senate, the
Taxpayer First Act will extinguish any remaining argument that AOs do not
hold positions within an office established by law.
V. POLICY REASONS FOR APPLYING THE APPOINTMENTS
CLAUSE TO AOS
In addition to legal precedent supporting the conclusion that AOs are
subject to the Appointments Clause, there are also policy arguments
supporting this conclusion as well. First, as described in the introduction,
applying the Appointments Clause to AOs will mitigate appearances of
impropriety found in their close relationship with the IRS. After all, the IRS
is a party, either directly or indirectly, to the CDP hearings conducted by
their AOs.212 Because AOs are hired and fired by the IRS, issues of
impropriety arise.213 That is, the IRS’s power to hire and fire AOs “creates
obvious incentives for [Officers] to favor agency positions.”214 Indeed, such
“[r]emoval authority has always been associated with control: It is the sine
qua non of effective supervision—the guarantee that subordinates will take
direction.”215 Subjecting AOs to appointment will increase appearances of
impartiality “[b]ecause the agency is no longer choosing the judge in its own
cause.”216 Further, by placing removal powers outside the IRS’s control,
“those appearing before [AOs] will feel more confident that the [IRS] is not
directing the actions of a marionette [adjudicator].”217

211. Id. at Sec. 11101 (adding subsection (e)(1) to I.R.C. § 7803 to formally codify an
“Independent Office of Appeals” within the IRS).
212. The Most Serious Problems Encountered by Taxpayers, IRS Pub. No. 2104, Vol. 1,
WL 9324360, at 139 (2017) (“Revenue Procedure 2012-18 provides Appeals with the
discretion to override Counsel. In reality, however, [AOs] may well be reluctant to do so when
Counsel actually has a seat at the table. An [AO] may lack the personal confidence or the
institutional support necessary to stand firm in exercising independent judgement in the face
of opposition . . .”); see also I.R.C. § 7122(c) (showing that AO’s decision to compromise
liability is still binding onto the IRS even where counsel is not present).
213. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105206, § 1203(a), 112 Stat. 685, 720-721 (1998) (Under the RRA, the Commissioner can only
remove AOs for good cause after a finding of misconduct).
214. ALJ Quandary, supra note 4, at 801 (Author speaking to appointment of ALJs, but
also applicable to appointment and removal of Appeals Officers).
215. Ross E. Wiener, Inter-Branch Appointments After the Independent Counsel: Court
Appointment of United States Attorneys, 86 MINN. L. REV. 363, 421 (2001) (citing Bowsher
v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986)).
216. ALJ Quandary supra note 4, at 847-48 (internal quotation marks omitted).
217. Id. at 848 (discussing the benefits of interbranch-appointment).
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Second, Appeals Officers should be subject to the Appointments Clause
because taxpayers have a statutory due process right to appeal disputes to an
independent Office of Appeal. That due process right is mandated under the
Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights, in I.R.C. Section 7803, which grants taxpayers a
“right to appeal a decision of the IRS in an independent forum.”218 Congress
reiterated the right to an independent Appeals Office under the RRA Section
1003, which directs the Treasury Secretary to “ensure an independent
appeals function” within the IRS.”219 However, the existing structure
allowing AOs to be removed by the IRS in no way fosters independence.
This concern has long been expressed by other appointed Officers, including
an IRS Commissioner who stated that “it would never be possible to give to
the taxpayer the fair and independent review to which [she is rightly entitled]
as long as the [trier of fact] is directly under, and its recommendations subject
to the approval of, the officer whose duty it is to administer the law and
collect the tax.”220 Subjecting AOs to appointment effectively increases the
independence of their decisions, and thus increases the general independence
of the IRS Appeals Office at large.
Third, as a matter of principle, Congress is prohibited from creating an
employee position and then, throughout time, slowly assigning that position
significant authority. Such a scenario poses a great threat to Executive
powers and political accountability. “Abuse could arise. For example,
Congress could take a pre-existing low-level position (which had been
created by the Executive branch pursuant to a general authorization like
§7804(a)),221 and which was not subject to the [Appointments Clause] and
could invest it with significant additional power, thus evading the
Appointments Clause [altogether].”222 This scenario represents the current
state of affairs with AOs, who have maintained employee status since their
creation in the late 1920’s.223 Throughout time, their power has grown
significantly. Most notably in 1998, with the passage of the RRA, which
invested AOs with authority to oversee statutorily mandated CDP

218. I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3)(E).
219. Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 1103, 112 Stat. 685,
720-721 (1998).
220. See Dubroff & Hellwig, supra note 11, at 47 (referring to 65 CONG. REC. 2614, at
2684 (1924) (Committee members “are the party in interest; they are plaintiff and the
prosecutor; they are the court and jury”) (remarks of Mr. Young)).
221. I.R.C § 7804(a) (clarifying that the Treasury Secretary delegated limited
appointment powers to the IRS Commissioner under).
222. See Tucker, 135 T.C. at 158.
223. Strekla & Morrison, supra note 24, at 28.
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hearings,224 to accept or reject offers in compromise,225 and to issue final
determinations of deficiencies on behalf of the IRS Commissioner.226
Subjecting AOs to appointment effectively prevents Congress from
delegating significant authority to employees without the formal vetting
procedures that are inherent to the Appointments Clause process.227 T hus, it
is imperative that AOs are subject to appointment.
Despite the policy reasons above, it can be argued that the appointments
process is cumbersome and inefficient. In addition, it can also be argued that
appointing IRS AOs would do little to remedy issues of impropriety because
the Executive branch would continue to choose the very candidates that fill
its adjudicative positions. However, such arguments hold little weight. First,
the appointments process is notoriously considered smooth and
unburdensome. In fact, even those who criticize its overuse admit the
appointments process is effectively automatic.228 Moreover, as discussed
below, the appointments process does not necessarily need to be placed in
the hands of the Executive. In fact, where IRS AOs are concerned, the
appointments process can most viably be placed in the hands of the Courts.
Doing so will effectively extinguish any issues of impropriety that could
arise with Executive appointments.
VI. METHODS FOR APPOINTING IRS AOS
As mentioned prior, inferior Officers can be appointed by the President
alone, the Courts, or by Department Heads.229 These methods of
appointment are best examined in two baskets: Executive appointments,
which includes appointment by the President and Department Heads, and
Judiciary appointments, which are accomplished through the Courts. The
pros and cons of these two baskets are discussed in turn. However, in the
case of IRS AOs, appointment by the Judiciary appears most viable for
reasons of impartiality and efficiency.
224. I.R.C § 6320(b)(1).
225. I.R.C. §7122(e)(2).
226. Treas. Reg. § 601.106(d)(ii) (“Officers of the Appeals officer having authority for
the administrative determination of tax liabilities referred to in paragraph (a) of this section
are also authorized to prepare, sign on behalf of the Commissioner, and send to the taxpayer…
any statutory notice of deficiency”).
227. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton). (claiming that the Appointments
Clause effectively discourages undue influence and allows for higher quality officers).
228. See Plecnik, supra note 83, at 239 (claiming where the appointments process is
triggered, “[t]he President, Courts of Law, and Heads of Departments will happily fire up
their autopens and appoint every single position in the federal government.”).
229. U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
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A. Appointment of AOs by the Executive Branch
Appointment by the Executive branch means that AOs would be
appointed by either the President or a Department Head—here, the Treasury
Secretary who is a principal Officer and is thus also appointed by the
President.230 As a preliminary matter, the power to remove is incident to the
power to appoint.231 Therefore, if AOs were not appointed by the Executive
branch,232 but were instead appointed by the Judiciary, the Executive would
lose its removal powers.233 The importance of Executive removal powers is
found under the “Take Care Clause” of the U.S. Constitution,234 which
ensures that “[t]he President should be able to oversee all people who
implement executive policy because doing so is necessary for the President
to take care that the law is faithfully executed.”235 By “limiting the
appointment power” to the President and his own principal appointees, the
framers sought to “ensure that those who wielded [the appointment power]
were accountable to political force and the will of the people.”236
However, allowing AOs to be appointed by the Executive branch
triggers two major issues. First, the Executive branch would still be able “to
choose the judge in its own cause.”237 That is, the Executive branch could
simply appoint a candidate “whom it believes will be most sympathetic to
agency positions.”238 The effective outcome would change little from the
230. See Tucker, 135 T.C. at 121(“(T)here is, so to speak, only one degree of separation
between any duly appointed officer and the President himself.”).
231. See Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161; see also Burnap, 252. U.S. at 515
(“The power to remove is, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, an incident of
the power to appoint.”).
232. This paper has consistently compared AOs to SEC ALJs. Currently, agency ALJs
are selected by the agency within which they work. See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (granting federal
agencies the power to select ALJs as are necessary for the agency to conduct adjudicatory
proceedings.).
233. See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 668-69 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (discussing the limited
constraints allowed to be placed on Presidential removal powers).
234. U.S. Const. art. II § 3.
235. See Tucker, 135 T.C. at 121; see also ALJ Quandary, supra note 4, at 815, 834
(discussing interbranch appointments for ALJs, the author states that “[a]gencies, among
others, could request that the [Court] discipline or remove an ALJ for inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance.”).
236. Id. (citing Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. at 884).
237. ALJ Quandary, supra note 4, at 847 (citing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556
U.S. 868, 886 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
238. See ALJ Quandary, supra note 4, at 818 (discussing implications of 5 U.S.C. § 3105
(granting agencies powers to select their ALJs); see also Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at
3180–81 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“My research reflects that the Federal Government
relies on 1,584 ALJs to adjudicate administrative matters in over 25 agencies.”).
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current scheme wherein AOs are hired by the IRS. Thus, as long as the
vetting process to select and appoint AO candidates is conducted by the
Executive branch, there stands potential for the appointment process to result
in a pool of AOs that are partial to IRS agendas. This outcome pushes further
against progressive policy goals seeking to ensure an “independent” appeals
process within the IRS.239
Second, similar issues arise so long as the Executive branch continues
to exercise its power to remove AOs because removal powers have long been
associated with influence and control.240 Indeed, even Congress has long
been weary of Executive powers to remove adjudicators, which is why tenure
protections have become increasingly popular.241 Thus, taking removal
powers away from the IRS and moving it up the “executive chain” does little
to displace such mechanisms of influence.242 After all, the IRS is within the
Treasury Department, and the Treasury Department is part of the Executive
branch at large. By keeping appointments of AOs within the same political
branch, the Appointments Clause is less able to fulfill its designed purpose
to ensure that agency adjudicators remain separate, and thus independent,
from the agencies to which they must sometimes rule against.243 Therefore,
to fully ensure AO independence, it is best to place appointment powers
outside the Executive branch.
B. Appointment of AOs by the Courts
Judicial appointment and removal will mitigate concerns of AO
impartiality because the Executive branch will no longer “choose the judge
in its own cause.”244 However, despite Judicial appointment and removal
(hereafter “interbranch appointment”) being a viable means to reduce agency
influence over its adjudicators, interbranch appointments are highly
contested. For example, the Supreme Court in Morrison clarified that
Congress’ authority to prescribe to the Judiciary the power to appoint
239. See Taxpayer First Act, H.R. 5444, 115th Cong. (2018).
240. Wiener, supra note 215.
241. ALJ Quandary, supra note 4, at 800 (discussing tenure as congressional means to
limit Executive removal); see also, Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1958)
(upheld limitations on Executive removal of agency adjudicators as means to render them
“entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect.”).
242. RRA, supra note 48, at §1203(a) (clarifying that the Commissioner of the IRS may
terminate IRS employees “for cause on charges of misconduct.”).
243. ALJ Quandary, supra note 4, at 809 (considering issues of ALJ subordination and
the separation-of-powers doctrine).
244. Id. at 847-848 (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. 556 U.S. 868, 886
(2009).)
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Executive officials is not unlimited.245 Indeed, the power for Congress to
prescribe interbranch-appointment is limited by the “principal of
incongruity.”246 Although there is much debate as to when interbranchappointments are “incongruous,”247 there is general agreeance that Courts
can appoint inferior Officers if such appointment does not impede the Courts
central function under the Constitution, and similarly does not impede the
Executive branch’s functioning in the same manner under the
Constitution.248
As a preliminary matter, Article II allows Congress to delegate to the
Courts the power to appoint inferior Officers.249 Moreover, such power is
often delegated, especially for the purposes of ensuring adjudicator
independence.250 In considering ALJ appointments, for example, it has been
argued that “granting the D.C. Circuit power to appoint adjudicators
generally, by itself, almost certainly does not impede the central functioning
of the judicial branch—that is, to decide disputes.”251 Support for such an
argument points to the knowledge, expertise, and time available to the Court
that is delegated the appointment power.252 For example, in terms of
knowledge, the D.C. Circuit is “considered the most influential court on
matters of administrative law, including ALJ’s decisions.”253 The D.C.
Circuit Court also has sufficient time because it maintains the lightest
caseload of all the Circuit Courts.254 It would therefore seem the D.C. Circuit
Court is also a viable means to appoint IRS AOs.

245. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 675 (1998) (“We do not mean to say that Congress’ power to
provide for interbranch appointments of ‘inferior [O]fficers’ is unlimited.”).
246. Id. at 675-76 (“In addition to separation of power concerns … Congress’ decision
to vest the appointment power in the courts would be improper if there was some ‘incongruity’
between the functions normally performed by the courts and the performance of their duty to
appoint.”).
247. ALJ Quandary, supra note 4, at 802 (“... [I]nterbranch appointment[s are]
appropriate when (1) Congress has a significant justification for turning to its interbranchappointment power, (2) the power to appoint (and an incidental power to remove) does not
impede the appointing branch’s central functioning under the U.S. Constitution, and (3) the
lack of appointment (and removal) power does not, likewise, impede the competing branch’s
central functioning.”).
248. Id.
249. See U.S. Const. art. I., § 2.
250. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 152, 631 (2006) (authorizing court appointment of bankruptcy and
magistrate judges, respectively).
251. ALJ Quandary, supra note 4, at 850.
252. Id. at 832.
253. Id.
254. The D.C. Circuit decided the least cases per active judge in comparison to all other
circuit courts. See Federal Court Management Statistics December 2014: Courts of Appeals,
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However, one could argue the Circuit Court lacks the technical
knowledge necessary to appoint Officers with such tax and audit-specific
duties. The functions of the IRS would be impeded because the D.C. Circuit
Court is unable to properly assess AO candidates of their own technical
knowledge. In addressing this argument, an alternative Court to the D.C.
Circuit Court could be the U.S. Tax Court. The Supreme Court in Freytag
considered the Tax Court a “Court of [l]aw” under the Appointments Clause,
and thereafter granted the Tax Court appointment authority over its STJs.255
The Tax Court certainly possesses the knowledge and experience necessary
to assess AOs of their own technical knowledge. Additionally, there is little
concern of impartiality by the Tax Court reviewing the opinions written by
the AOs it directly appointed. This is because judges often decide cases “in
which they have selected, for instance, defense counsel for the indigent,
bankruptcy judges, magistrates, and special masters (all of whom could be
the judges former law clerks) without impugning their impartiality.”256
In either instance, whether AOs are appointed by the D.C. Circuit Court or
the U.S. Tax Court, the Executive branch’s central functioning will not be
impeded. If the removal of an AO is merited, the IRS will traverse the same
removal procedures it currently has in place, except it will traverse those
procedures before an external authority. Specifically, the IRS can currently
remove its employees with cause.257 The same “for cause” requirements are
present in “external” removal proceedings.258 The only difference is that the
IRS will need to persuade an independent entity to remove the AO.259 Such
persuasion entails the same showing of “good cause” that is currently in
place.260 Therefore, by subjecting AOs to interbranch appointment, the IRS
will experience little if any impediment to its central function—to enforce
U.S. tax law with “integrity and fairness to all.”261

U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/na/federal-court-managemen
t-statist ics/2014/12/31 (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
255. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 913 (1991).
256. ALJ Quandary, supra note 4, at 854; see also, United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19
(1st Cir. 2000) (discussing judge-appointed defense counsel and prosecutors).
257. RRA, supra note 48, at §1203(a).
258. See Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam’rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 132 (1953)
(“Examiners shall be removable by the agency in which they are employed only for good
cause established and determined by the Civil Service Commission after opportunity for
hearing and upon the record thereof.”) (internal parentheses omitted).
259. ALJ Quandary, supra note 4, at 856 (discussing interbranch removal, stating “the
agency must continue to persuade an independent entity to remove an ALJ.”).
260. RRA, supra note 48, at §1203(a).
261. IRS Mission Statement and Statutory Authority, https://www.irs.gov/about-irs/theagency-its-mission-and-statutory-authority (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).

3 - DYKZEUL_HBLJV17-1 (DO NOT DELETE)

Winter 2021

TURBULENT TIME AT TREASURY

12/2/20 12:47 PM

65

VI. CONCLUSION
The fairness and independence of the IRS Appeals process is
jeopardized so long as the IRS possesses the authority to hire and fire its AOs
who were created to be independent adjudicators. Subjecting AOs to the
Appointments Clause will mitigate appearances of impropriety by placing
authority to hire and fire outside the IRS. Further, AOs are required to be
appointed. AOs wield significant authority in issuing final decisions that
bind the IRS to settlement agreements with third parties. The Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence has long required such appointment, but with the most
recent opinion in Lucia, there is little doubt that AOs possess the necessary
authority for Officer status and should be appointed as such.
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